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Earlier analyses of area yield crop insurance schemes used a linear additive model 
(LAM) to express the relationship between individual and area yield.  Although similar to 
the capital asset pricing model used in finance, the theoretical foundations of the LAM 
are unknown.  A contribution of this paper is the derivation of the precise conditions 
under which area aggregation results in a LAM, thus establishing a link between micro 
variables and LAM parameters.  The conditions are two-fold.  They relate to the 
interaction of risks in individual technologies and on the extent of aggregation.  We show 
that if systemic and individual risks are additive in individual yields and if the 
aggregation is such that the law of large numbers hold then the LAM obtains. The paper 
also shows how departures from these conditions affect the results derived from a LAM 
analysis.   
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  Aggregation in Area Yield Crop Insurance: 
The Linear Additive Model 
 
Introduction 
  A classic issue in agricultural economics is the design of schemes that would offer 
insurance against production risks in agriculture.  The experience with conventional crop 
insurance has been disappointing as insurers have struggled to obtain reliable actuarial 
data on individual yields (Skees, Black and Barnett). The primary attraction of area yield 
insurance schemes is that insurers do not have to contend with the informational 
problems of moral hazard and adverse selection (Halcrow).  These problems can be 
dismissed because indemnities and premiums are based not on a producer’s individual 
yield but rather on the aggregate yield of a surrounding geographical area.  However, the 
key question is how adequate are aggregate yield instruments for reducing the risks faced 
by producers?   
To address this question, previous studies have expressed individual yields as a 
linear stochastic function of area yield (Mahul, Miranda, Vercammen).  The approach has 
been to use the form of a linear regression model where the dependent variable is the 
yield of an individual producer, the only independent variable is area yield and where the 
additive random error term measures omitted individual-specific factors uncorrelated 
with area yield.  Thus, the model decomposes variations in individual yield to variations 
in area yield that represents systemic risk and variations in the error term that represents 
individual-specific or non-systemic risk.  The key parameter of the model is the so-called 
beta coefficient, which is the slope coefficient in the relation.  It has been shown that the 
beta determines the extent of risk reduction as well as the form of the optimal insurance.  
As the model combines linearity and additivity (of the error term to area yield), it can be 
  1 called the linear additive model (LAM). The literature assumes the LAM and does not 
derive it.  In principle, the LAM can be useful in any kind of risk analysis where it is 
important to distinguish between systemic and non-systemic risk, and thus, it is important 
to better understand its underlying conceptual fundamentals..   
As the implications for area yield crop insurance flow from the model, this paper 
investigates the theoretical foundations of the LAM.  On surface, the LAM bears a 
striking similarity to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of finance.  The CAPM 
postulates returns on individual assets to be a linear stochastic function of the returns on 
the market portfolio.  The CAPM beta – the slope coefficient in the model – measures the 
sensitivity of asset returns to the returns on the market portfolio.  Variations in asset 
returns are the sum of variations in systemic risk (as measured by the variation in the 
returns to the market portfolio), and variations in individual-specific risk (as denoted by 
the random term in the CAPM).   
The theoretical basis of the CAPM is well known.  It lies in mean variance utility 
functions, optimizing investor behaviour, two-fund separation results and the efficiency 
of a market portfolio (Merton).  However, there is no meaningful way of transferring 
these arguments to the context of area yield crop insurance.  Clearly, the LAM of area 
yield crop insurance is the consequence of aggregation of individual producer 
technologies and is not the outcome of optimization.  CAPM type arguments are 
therefore inapplicable.   
  This paper derives the precise conditions under which the LAM is valid.  The 
conditions are two-fold applying to individual technologies and on the extent of 
aggregation.  We show that if systemic and individual risks are additive in individual 
  2 yields and if the aggregation is such that the law of large numbers hold then the LAM 
obtains.  These are sufficient conditions.  The additivity property of systemic and 
individual risks is a necessary condition.  Interestingly, the LAM is otherwise 
independent of assumptions about the functional form of the production function.  
Neither does the LAM require assumptions about the functional form of the density 
function of the random variables.  
  These results are important for two reasons.  First, they extend the applicability of 
LAM to new questions.  For instance, what are  the underlying factors determining the  
individual betas and the additive disturbance term of the LAM?  We show these factors 
include producer actions as well as features of insurance design.  In this paper, we use 
this understanding to analyse how the level of aggregation matters to risk reduction and 
insurance demand.  There are other potential uses as well.  The LAM can also be used to 
analyse the “nexus between the producer’s insurance choice and his farm-level 
production decisions” which otherwise (i.e., in the absence of our results) would not be 
possible (Chambers and Quiggin).  Second, our results shed light on the circumstances in 
which the LAM is not valid.  To develop these extensions to and conditions on the LAM 
model, we begin with a discussion of the basic model.  
  
Literature 
  The LAM is of the following form:  
(1)      i i i i y y ε µ β µ+ − + = ) ( 
where yi is producer i’s yield, µi is the unconditional mean of yi, i.e., E(yi), y is area yield, 
βi is the slope parameter satisfying ,  µ is the unconditional mean of y  2 / ) , ( y i i y y Cov σ β=
  3 and εi is a mean zero random variable uncorrelated with area yield.  Equation (1) 
decomposes individual yield variation into a systemic component  perfectly 
correlated with area yield (since Cov and a non-
systemic or individual-specific componentε uncorrelated with area yield.   
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Suppose the indemnity schedule is  where yc is a yield 
trigger fixed exogenously. Then Miranda showed that the extent of variance reduction is 
proportional to βi (and other exogenous parameters that do not vary across producers). 
It thus follows that the more highly correlated a producer’s yield is to the area yield, the 
greater is the risk reduction.   
Mahul considered the choice of an optimal contract  .  If insurance is 
actuarially fair, then the optimal contract is characterized by  where y ) y m, 
the yield trigger, is the maximum possible value of y.
1  Hence the slope of the optimal 
indemnity schedule is -βi.  An aspect of this result, not noted by Mahul but relevant for 
us, is that the optimal indemnity schedule is independent of the non-systemic risk and its 
moments (such as Var(εi)).    
Another implication is that optimal area yield insurance completely eliminates the 
systemic risk.  To see this, note that a producer’s revenue with insurance (denoted π) is  
(2)     π  
where P is the premium.  When a producer chooses the optimal area yield insurance, (2) 
becomes  
                                                 
1 For the LAM in (1), Vercammen considers the optimal design of an area yield crop insurance contract 
when the yield trigger is constrained, for institutional reasons, to be below the maximum possible value of 
area yield.   
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where we have used (1).  But when insurance is actuarially fair,  .  
Substituting in (3), we see that the producer bears only the non-systemic risk, i.e.,   
) ( µ β− = m i y P
(4)     π+   i i ε µ =
Thus optimal area yield insurance fully insures against the systemic risk.  Since the 
optimal insurance is independent of the riskiness of the non-systemic risk εi, we have the 
result that the optimal area yield insurance delivers full insurance against the insured 
(systemic) risk whatever be the riskiness of the uninsured (non-systemic) risk.   
  Conventional individual yield crop insurance offers insurance against both 
systemic and non-systemic risks; however because of moral hazard such insurance comes 
with a deductible.  By contrast, optimal area yield crop insurance does not contain a 
deductible but insures only against systemic risk.  If the deductible in the individual yield 
insurance is large enough, area yield insurance would reduce risk more effectively than 
individual yield insurance.  Miranda demonstrates this possibility empirically.   
  The LAM is tractable and delivers clear predictions about the design of optimal 
insurance and its effectiveness in reducing producer risk.  However, several fundamental 
questions remain.  Although the properties of optimal insurance depend on the LAM 
betas, the LAM itself says nothing about how the betas are determined.  In terms of their 
individual characteristics, why might some producers have higher betas than others?  An 
even more basic question is why should individual yields be related to area yields linearly 
as in the LAM?   
  Chambers and Quiggin have criticised the LAM because it models yield as a 
stochastic variable not subject to control by the producer.  As they correctly point out, 
  5 this makes the LAM inappropriate for investigating producer response to area-yield 
insurance.  However, we shall show that if the LAM is derived from the aggregation of 
individual technologies, then its parameters can be seen to be functions of individual 
choice variables.  The criticism of Chambers and Quiggin will then no longer apply.   
 
A Structural Model of Systemic and Non-Systemic Risks 
In this section, we derive the LAM from a description of individual production 
technologies.  As these are the primitives, the specification of production environments 
constitutes a structural model.   
Consider a region R where there are n producers.  Producer i’s yield yi, is given by  
(5)        i i i y η µ =
where µi is producer i’s mean yield and ηi is a unit mean random variable capturing the 
risks of farming.  (5) is a standard specification of stochastic technologies where risks are 
multiplicative to mean yields.  The mean yield is a function of inputs controlled by the 
producer.  However, we purposely leave the functional form of this relationship 
unspecified.  η
i µ
i is a linear combination of two independent shocks and is given by  
(6)     η+   γθ α = i i e
where ei is a shock specific to i and θ  is a shock common to all producers in region R.  
We therefore refer to ei as the non-systemic or individual risk and θ as the systemic or 
aggregate risk.  The individual and aggregate risks satisfy the following properties: 
,     , , and Cov .  To ensure 
the composite risk η
1 ) ( = θ E   , 1 ) ( = i e E i e Cov i   all for     0 ) ( = θ j i e e j i ≠ =   all for    0 ) (
i has unit mean, we impose the restriction (α + γ) = 1.  Individual 
yields are, therefore, 
  6 (7)        ) ( i i i e y α γθ µ+ =
 
We also assume that individual risks are independent of mean yields, i.e.,  |   µ i e E( i) = 
E(ei).   
This completes the description of the structural model.  In this model, the composite 
risk is multiplicative to mean yields and its components are additive.  We therefore call it 
a model with multiplicative risks and additive components (MRAC).  Our goal is to 
discover whether the MRAC model can be represented as a LAM.  If so, how do the 
parameters of the LAM (  and Var ) depend on the micro parameters of the 
structural model?  The answers are not obvious.   
i β ) ( i ε
The area yield for the region R is  






i i e w w y w y ∑ ∑ ∑ + = =µ α µ γθ
where wi denotes the area share of the ith producer.  Let µ denote the mean area yield 
(i.e., average of the mean yields of producers). Then,   and   ∑ =
i
i i w µ µ
(8)       ) ( i i
i
i e w y ∑ + =µ α γθµ
Now decompose  as   ) ( i i
i
i e w ∑ µ
(9)     e e e w e w
i
i i i i i
i
i µ µ µ µ+ − − =∑ ∑ ) )( ( ) ( 
where  ∑ =
i
i ie w e is the area average of individual risks.  Note that the first term on the 
right-hand side of (9) is the sample covariance (weighted) between mean yields and 
individual risk.   If the region contains a large number of producers, and if the law of 
large numbers applies, the sample covariance will approach (in probability) the 
  7 population covariance (assumed to be zero).  Similarly, e
) i e
 in large samples will be close 
to E(ei).  
When wi = (1/n), it is straightforward to use the law of large numbers to obtain 
large sample results.  In the case of weighted averages, however, a restriction on the 
weights is necessary.  Essentially, we need to assume that the average yield is not 
dominated by the yield of any single producer.  This requirement is automatically 
satisfied by the unweighted sum but needs to be explicitly assumed in the case of 
weighted sums.
2  Assuming this condition to be satisfied, we use large sample 
approximations to obtain 
(10)       µ µ µ µ= + = ∑ ( ) , ( ) ( i i i i
i
i E e Cov e w
Substituting in (8), area yield is  
(11)        µ α γθ ] [ + = y
Thus, area yield is random only because of aggregate systemic shocks as individual risks 
cancel out in the aggregate.  Since area yield is a monotonic function of θ, the inverse 
function exists and is given by  
    θ   µγ µα / ] [ − = y
Substituting for θ in (7), we obtain producer yield as a function of area yield, i.e.,  
     or   i i i i e y y α µ µα µ µ+ − = ) )( / (
                                                 
2 Consider  where xi is i.i.d with mean µ and  . Then .  By 
Chebychev’s inequality, given any δ > 0, Prob[ | |>δ]≤ , the limit of 
which tends to zero as long as for every n, there exists a bound c such that  and c(n) → for large 
n.   
∑
i
i ix a 1 = ∑
i
i a
µ − i ix
µ = ∑ ) (
i
i ix a E
∑
i
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which is identical to the LAM in (1) if we denote  and    
Hence we have the following result.   
i i β µ µ= ) / ( i i i e ε α µ= − ) 1 (.
 
Proposition 1:  In the MRAC model described by equations (5) to (7), the relationship 
between individual yield and area yield follows a LAM.  The LAM parameters are 
related to the structural parameters in the following manner:  
(a)    ) / ( µ µ β i i =
(b)  ε   ) 1 ( − = i i i e α µ
 
From part (a), we see that for any individual producer the β parameter is the ratio 
of a producer’s mean yield to the mean of area yield. It follows immediately that 
.  Miranda noted this result earlier.  From part (b), we see that the error term 
in the linear projection of individual yield on area yield is heteroscedastic. In particular, 
=  which varies across producers even if the non-systemic risk in the 
structural model is homoscedastic.   
1 = ∑
i
i i w β
) ( i Var ε i µ
2 2 2
e σ α
In an empirical analysis of 102 cotton farms in Kentucky, Miranda observed that 
the distribution of the empirical betas possesses a regular, bell shape centred on 1.  We 
now know the conditions under which this result obtains.  Proposition 1 says that this 
property is inherited from the distribution of average yields.  Since the distribution of 
average yields depends on the dispersion of soil and climatic conditions in the region, 
Proposition 1 provides the formal basis for Miranda’s conjecture that “..the more 
homogenous are the soil and climatic conditions faced by producers in a given area, the 
  9 more closely the βi ‘s will cluster around one.” (pp 236).  To this, we can also add that 
the dispersion of betas will depend on the heterogeneity in the other factors that 
determine yield such as management practices, farming skills and capital assets.  In the 
extreme when all farmers have the same mean yield, they will also have betas identically 
equal to one.   As mean yield depends on input application and technology, production 
decisions affect the beta parameter and the disturbance term of the LAM.  Proposition 1 
thus provides the basis for using the LAM to investigate producer behaviour in the 
presence of area-yield insurance.
3   
Interestingly, the LAM is surprisingly general as its parameters are independent of  
assumptions about the (a) the functional form of the relationship between input 
application and mean yield and about (b) the probability density of the systemic and non-
systemic risks.  Recall that these assumptions are left unspecified in the structural model.  
 
Systemic Risks, Non-Systemic Risks and Aggregation  
  A design problem is the selection of the area that should be used as the basis for 
computing area yields.  To maximize correlation of producer yield with area yield, it has 
been suggested that “the area or zone boundaries for an area yield contract should be 
selected so as to group together the largest possible number of farms with similar soils 
and climate” (Skees, Black and Barnett).  Can this recommendation be evaluated using 
the LAM or do we need to turn to an underlying structural model?  
                                                 
3 Chambers and Quiggin who examined it within a state-contingent model brought this issue to the fore. 
  10 Suppose producer yields can be averaged at two levels of aggregation.
4  For 
convenience, call the smaller aggregation a cluster and the larger aggregation as a county.  
Under the LAM, producer yields are related to cluster yields in the following manner: 
(13)          
1 1 ) ( ick ck ck ick ick ick y y ε µ β µ − + = +
+
                                                
where yick and are the individual yield and its expected value of producer i in cluster c 
of county k,  y
ick µ
ck and µck are the area yield and its expected value of cluster c in county k, 
 is the slope coefficient and ε  is a shock specific to producer i in cluster c of county 





(14)         
2 2 ) ( ick k k ick ick ick y y ε µ β µ − + =
where yk and µk are the area yield and its expected value of county k,   is the slope 
coefficient and ε  is a shock specific to producer i in cluster c of county k.  Note that the 
notation allows the slope coefficient as well as the individual specific risk to vary with  





From (4), we know that when area yield insurance is optimal, the producer bears 
only the non-systemic risk.  Thus, in the case of cluster yield insurance, the variability of 
producer’s profit is Var while it is Var in the case of county yield insurance.  
When is variability lower?  The LAM cannot answer this question because it does not 
show how the non-systemic risk is determined.  For this, we have to turn to the 
underlying structural model.    
) (
1
ick ε ) (
2
ick ε
Consider a variant of the MRAC model of the previous section.  Yield of 
producer i in cluster c of county k is given by   
 
4 Extension to many levels is straightforward.  
  11       where   ick ick ick y η µ =
k ck ick ick e 2 3 1 2 1 θ α θ α α η+ + =  
where eick is a shock specific to i, θ1ck  is a shock specific to all producers in cluster c of 
county k and θ2k is a shock common to all producers in county k.  In other words, eick  is 
the individual risk, θ1ck is the cluster-specific risk and θ2k is the county-specific risk. The 
risks have unit means, constant variances and are stochastically independent.  Also 
assume  .   This ensures the mean of y ∑ =1 i α ick is µick.  The individual risk eick is 
distributed independently of the individual mean yield µick.   
The average yield of cluster c in county k can be calculated as  








ick w e w y w µ θ α θ α µ α ) ( 2 3 1 2 1
where   is the share of the ith producer in the area of cluster c.  Denote cluster c’s 
yield as y
ick w
ck and its mean as µck.  By arguments similar to that in the preceding section, 
substitute ∑  by its large sample approximation µ ick ick
i
ick e w µ ck.  Hence  
(15)       ck k ck ck y µ θ α θ α α ] [ 2 3 1 2 1 + + =
Thus, cluster yields are random because of cluster-specific risk and county-specific risk.  
Area yield insurance schemes at the cluster level would therefore offer protection against 
both these risks.  Write  θ .  θ ) ( 2 3 1 2 k ck k θ α θ α + = k denotes the systemic risk at the cluster 
level.  Hence, for the cluster yield insurance scheme, we can write the equations of the 
structural model as  
(16)      and  ) ( 1 k ick ick ick ick ick e y θ α µ η µ+ = =
(17)       ck k ck y µ θ α ) ( 1 + =
  12 By Proposition 1, the relationship between individual and cluster yields follows a LAM 
as in (13).  Furthermore, the beta of an individual producer can be computed as 
.  By the same proposition, the disturbance term in the LAM model 
isε   Hence, for a producer with cluster yield insurance, the variance of 
profits is Var .  The reduction in variance due to cluster yield 
insurance is therefore, .   
ck ick ick µ µ β /
1 =
( 1
1 = ick ick e µ α
(
). 1 − ick
( )
1
ick α ε= ) ( )
2
1 ick ick e Var µ
) (
2
ick ick Var Var η − ) ( ) (
1
k ick Var θ ε µ=
  Consider next area yield insurance schemes where the indemnity is contingent on 
county yield rather than cluster yield.   The average yield of county k can be calculated by 
using (15) to average across clusters within the county.  Hence   
ck
c






ck ck w w w y w µ θ α µ θ α µ α ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ + + = 2 3 1 2 1  
where wck is the share of cluster c in area of county k.  Denote yk  to be county yield and 
µk to be its mean.  Because θ is a cluster specific risk, averaging across clusters should 
lead this risk to be approximately equal to its expected value.  Using this approximation 




ck w µ µ θ= ∑ 1
    k k k y µ θ α α α ) ( 2 3 2 1 + + =
Denoting α+  as α, and α+ as v 2 1 α ck i e 1 2 1 θ α ick, the structural equations for the county 
yield insurance scheme are  
(18)        and  ) ( 2 3 k ick ick ick v y θ α µ+ =
(19)       k k k y µ θ α α ) ( 2 3 + =
Now, compare (16) and (18).  At the county level, the systemic risk is θ2k while it is θk at 
the cluster level.  The non-systemic individual specific risk changes too.  At the county 
  13 level, what is measured as the non-systemic risk is α+  while it is α  at the 
cluster level.  Interestingly, higher aggregation reduces systemic risk and increases non-
systemic individual specific risk.  In the extreme, averages at the level of nation or group 
of nations may be so stable that the systemic risk component of a producer’s yield might 
be close to zero.  In such a case, all producer risk would be non-systemic individual 
specific risk.   
ck ick e 1 2 1 θ α ick e 1
Applying Proposition 1, the relation between individual and county yields can be 
represented as a LAM as in (14).   Furthermore,   and the disturbance term 
isε    It follows that for a producer with optimal county yield insurance, 
the variability in profits would be Var  = 
.  Consequently, the reduction in variance due 
to county yield insurance schemes is Var .   




ick ick v Var
) ( 3
2 2
i ick Var α µ ε η=
). (
2 α µ = ick ick ick v
) ( )2
1 ick ick e Var µ α+
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) ( 1ck Var θ
) ( i −
) ( ( 2




Compared with the reduction achieved by cluster yield insurance, we see that the 
cluster yield insurance achieves an additional variance reduction of Var .  
This happens because, while θ
) ( 1 2 ck ick θ α µ
1ck is a systemic risk at the cluster level, it becomes a non-
systemic risk at the county level and is therefore not insured by the county yield 
insurance scheme.
5  It is now clear that the division of producer risk into systemic and 
non-systemic risks is dependent on the level of aggregation.  The higher is the level of 
aggregation, the greater are individual risks, the smaller are systemic risks and hence the 
smaller are the risk reduction impacts of area-yield insurance.   
 
5 It is easy to show that cluster yields are more correlated with producer yields than county yields.   
  14 Skees, Black and Barnett are right in emphasizing that farms with similar soils 
and climate should be grouped together.  In terms of the structural model, such a 
grouping would face risks that do not cancel out in the aggregate, and hence qualify as 
systemic risks.  However, what our analysis has pointed out is that more risks are likely 
to survive aggregation (and hence be regarded as systemic) when the farmer groups are 
small.  Hence, for area yield insurance to have the maximum impact on risk reduction, 
the area boundaries for an area yield contract should be selected so as to group together 
the smallest (and not the largest) number of farms with similar soils and climate.  
However, we now face the problem that large sample approximations will fail in small 
aggregations.  The implications of this failure are investigated in a later section where we 
show that, fortunately, a modified linear model emerges.  More importantly, none of the 
results on optimal insurance are affected.   
 
A General Structural Model 
The earlier sections presented a structural model that led to the LAM used in 
evaluations of area-yield insurance.  But there might be other structural models as well 
which imply a LAM.  What are they?  Conversely, what are instances of structural 
models that do not imply a LAM?   
Some examples of popular specifications other than the MRAC model are the 
following:  
(a)  Model of Additive risks with Additive components (ARAC):      θ µ+ + = i i i e y
(b) The Just-Pope model with Additive Components (JPAC):       ) ( i i i i e y + + =θ σ µ
(c)  Model of Multiplicative Risks with Multiplicative Components (MRMC):  .    θ µ i i i e y =
  15 Do any or all of these models imply the LAM?  To answer this, we characterize the entire 
class of structural models that imply the LAM.  Suppose a general structural model of the 
form  
      )
)
, , ( θ i i i e f y z =
where, as before, ei and θ  are the random realizations of individual risk and aggregate 
shock and  f is a function that maps the individual risk, the aggregate shock and a vector 
of parameters z into realized yields.  In the MRAC model, zi consisted of a single 
parameter µi, the i’th producer’s mean yield.  Suppressing zi, we can write the model as  
(20)          f y =   ) , ( θ i i i e
where the function fi is now specific to producer i.   
If the relationship between individual yield and area yield is linear as in a LAM, 
then what restrictions must the function fi satisfy?   
 
Proposition 2: If the relationship between individual and area yields is described by a 
LAM as in (1), the structural model (20) necessarily satisfies the following:  
(a) For all i,  where h ) ( ) ( ) , ( θ θ i i i i i i g e h e f y + = = i and gi are functions that map 
non-systemic shocks and systemic shocks respectively into individual yields.  
(b) For all i, there exists a function k(.) and a parameter λi such that, 
 where c i i i c k g + = ) ( ) ( θ λ θ i is a constant of integration.  
Proof:   The structural model (20) satisfies 
      / )( / ( ) / ( i i i i i i e y e y ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ε ε
But from (1),  . Hence   1 / = ∂ ∂ i i y ε
  16    (    = ∂ ∂ ) / i i e y ) / ( i i e ∂ ∂ε
Recall that the LAM splits the variation in individual yields into variation in area yield y 
and an individual-specific risk ε .  By assumption, y and ε  are orthogonal.  It follows 
that area yield y is a function of θ  alone while ε  is a function of e
i i
i i alone.  Hence  
0 ) / ( ) / (
2 2 = ∂ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ∂θ ε θ i i i i e e y  
i.e., the cross-partial derivatives of (20) are zero.  Since this can be true only if (20) is 
additive in the two risks, we have the result in part (a).   
We now turn to the proof of part (b) of Proposition 2.  Define the parameter δi = 
.  δ θ ∂ ∂ / i y
/ = ∂θ y
i measures the sensitivity of producer i’s yield to aggregate shocks.  Also 
define δ as the sensitivity of area yield to aggregate shocks, i.e., δ . Since 
, we have δ .  Now  
θ ∂ = / y ∂








(21)      δi =   = δ .    ) / )( / ( / θ θ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ y y y y i i ) / ( y yi ∂ ∂
Hence, for all i, 
(22)      
δ
δi
i y y = ∂ ∂ /    
Fix a producer j and define, for all i, λi =  .  Clearly λ ) / /( ) / ( y y y y j i ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ j is 1.   Using 
(22) we obtain, δ= .  Using part (a) of Proposition 4, this can be written as   j i i δ λ
(23)      .    ) / ( / θ λ θ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ j i i g g
λi does not vary with the aggregate shock θ .  This can be seen from the LAM in equation 
(1), where for all i, is a parameter that is independent of the realization of θ.   
Integrating both sides of (22) with respect to θ, we therefore find that, for all i, the 
y yi ∂ ∂ /
  17 structural model satisfies   where c i j i i c g g + = ) ( ) ( θ λ θ
) i e ( ) ( i i i e h k b a + +θ
[ )] ( [ i i h E k E b a + + =θ
i is a constant of integration that 
varies with i.  Since j is arbitrarily chosen, we define k(θ) to be  .  This proves part 
(b).   
) (θ j g
Proposition 2 specifies the class of structural models implied by the LAM. 
Notice that the LAM does not restrict the way in which the risks affect production.  
However, the LAM does require that either the components of risk or their effects on 
production be additive.  As a result, the model of multiplicative risks with multiplicative 
components (MRMC) does not satisfy the necessary conditions identified in Proposition 
2.  We have the important result that the LAM is inappropriate in this case.   However, 
the ARAC and JPAC structural models meet the conditions of Proposition 2 and are 
therefore not inconsistent with a LAM.  The next result considers the converse 
relationship: does every member of the class identified in Proposition 2 imply the LAM?  
The answer is yes, provided the aggregation is large enough.   
 
Proposition 3:  The structural model in (20) implies a LAM if (a) the area weighted 
average of individual risks can be replaced by its large sample equivalent of population 
average and if (b) the structural model satisfies  
(24)   =    , ( i i f y θ = ) i
 where   and   are monotone functions, a (.) i k (.) i h i and bi are parameters that possibly 
vary with i.   
Proof:  From (24), mean producer yield is  
(25)       )] ( i i i e µ
Adding and subtracting µi to the right-hand side of (24), and using (25), we get 
  18 (26)     )]] ( [ ) ( [ )] ( ) ( [ i i i i i i i e h E e h Ek k b y − + − + =θ θ µ
Now using (24), area yield is  
(27)       ) ( ) ( i i i e h w bk a y ∑ + + =θ
where  and  .  Using the weak law of large numbers, 
can be approximated in large samples by  .
i ia w a ∑ =
i i e h ) (
i ib w b ∑ =
∑
i
i w )] ( [ i i
i
i e h E w ∑
6  Hence  
(28)         )] ( [ ) ( ) ( i i i e h E w bk a y ∑ + + =θ θ
Mean area yield is therefore  
(29)       )] ( [ ) ( i i i e h E w bEk a ∑ + + =θ µ
From (28) and (29),  .  Substituting in (26) and defining, 
 and ( , we get  
)] ( ) ( [ θ θ µ Ek k b y − = −
i i i i e Eh e ε = − )) ( ) ( i i b b β = ) / ( i h
    i i i i y y ε µ β µ+ − + = ) ( 
where εi is a mean zero random variable uncorrelated with area yield.   
  The above proof also derives the relationship of the structural parameters to the 
parameters of the LAM model.  As it is useful to identify this result separately, we have 
the next proposition. 
 
Proposition 4:  In the general structural model that is equivalent to the LAM, the 
parameters satisfy  
(a) b .    i i b β = /
  19 (b) h i i i i i e Eh e ε = − ) ( ) ( 
  Two implications of Proposition 4 are worthy of special mention.  bi measures the 
sensitivity of producer i’s yield to aggregate shocks while b is the sensitivity of area yield 
to aggregate shocks.  Part (a) of Proposition 6 therefore states that βi, the sensitivity of 
producer i’s yield to area yield is that producer’s sensitivity to aggregate shocks relative 
to the sensitivity of area yield to aggregate shocks.  Also recall that when area yield 
insurance is optimal, the producer bears only the risk ε .  From part (b) of Proposition 6, 
it can be seen therefore that, with optimal area yield insurance, the variability of producer 
profits is Var   
i
)). ( ( i i e h
Given Proposition 4, it is easy to compute the betas for special cases of the 
general structural model.  We consider a few specifications that were mentioned at the 
beginning of this section.   
(i) MRAC:     ) ( i i i e y α γθ µ+ =
This is the multiplicative specification considered earlier.  It is additive in the interaction 
of systemic and non-systemic shocks.  Fix any j and define  .  Define b γθ µ θ j k = ) (
i b y
j µ µ /
i = 
(µi/µj) and  .  Then, individual yields can be written as , 
which is a special case of the structural model (20).  Here, b =  .  Applying 
Proposition 4, we compute β
i i i i e e h α µ = ) ( ) ( ) ( i i i e h k + =θ
i as  .     µ µ / i
(ii)  ARAC:    θ µ+ + = i i i e y
                                                                                                                                                 
i i i i e e h µ = ) ( ∑ i ih w
∑∑ ∑ = = =µ µ µ i i i i i i i w e E w h E w ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( = i e E
6 In the MRAC model,  .  Hence in large samples,  converges in probability to 
,  given the assumption  for all i. 
  20   In this specification, risks are additive to mean yield.  It clearly satisfies (20).  
Here k(θ) = θ, bi = 1 and so b = 1.  Hence βi = 1 for all i.  Note this result obtains even 
though producers are heterogeneous in mean yields.  We can now see that what is 
important for there to be heterogeneity in betas is heterogeneity in the way the aggregate 
shock affects mean yields.   
(iii) JPAC:    ) ( i i i i e y + + =θ σ µ
This is the specification of a stochastic production function due to Just and Pope.  This is 




i i w σ
i = σi/σ.   
 
Small Aggregations 
  The results in the earlier section point to the fact that a LAM is a consequence of 
additive interaction of systemic and non-systemic risks.  However, while such structure 
of risks is necessary, it is not sufficient to ensure a LAM with conventional properties.  
Some structure is also required on the extent of aggregation.  For this reason, Proposition 
3 assumed it was valid to use large sample approximations.  What if this assumption was 
seriously violated?  What would be the relation between individual yield and area yield in 
small aggregations? 
  Suppose the structural model satisfies (24).  The question is interesting only for 
this case because we already know that a LAM does not obtain otherwise.  Given (24), 
equations (25), (26) and (27) are immediate consequences and their derivation does not 
involve large sample approximations.  Using (27), mean area yield is  
  21 (30)       )] ( [ ) ( i i i e h E w bEk a ∑ + + =θ µ
From (27) and (30), we can solve for [ as   )] ( ) ( θ θ Ek k −
) ( ) ( θ θ Ek k − =    b A b y / / ) ( − −µ
where  .  If the aggregation is large, the difference A 
could be approximated as zero by Chebychev’s law of large numbers.  But otherwise, it is 
a non-zero random variable.  Substituting for [ in (27),   
∑∑ − = )] ( [ ) ( i i i i i i e h E w e h w A
)] ( ) ( θ θ Ek k −
   i i i i i y A y ε µ β β µ+ − + − = ) ( 
where we have used the definitions (  and ( .  Separating 
out the quantity A into its stochastic and a non-stochastic components and re-arranging 
terms, we obtain  
i i b b β = ) / i i i i i e Eh e h ε = − )) ( ) (
     )) ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ( ∑ ∑ − + − + + = i i i i i i i i i i i e h w y e h E w y ε µ β β µ
Letting φ and  v , we get   ∑ + = )) ( ( ( i i i i i i e h E w β µ )) ) ( ( ∑ − = i i i i i e h w ε
(31)          i i i i v y y + − + = ) ( µ β φ
Surprisingly,  a linear relation between producer yield and area yield obtains once again.  
However, in other respects, the properties of (31) are different from (1).  First, the 
intercept term is no longer the mean producer yield.  Second, the error term is no longer 
uncorrelated across producers even when individual risks are uncorrelated.  This happens 
because of the common random component  in each of the      
is nothing but the area average of individual risks.  In small aggregations, this is no 
longer equal to the population average but is a random quantity.  As the area average y is 
also a function of   , the error term v
∑ ) ( i i i e h w . 's vi ∑ ) ( i i i e h w
∑ ) ( i i i e h w i is correlated with y.  The important 
  22 implication of this result is  that, if the betas are estimated by an ordinary least squares 
regression, they are inconsistent.  In particular, since vi is negatively correlated with y,  
plim(   i i i i i
OLS
i y Var v y Cov β β β β> − = ) ( / ) , ( )
^
  Even though (31) does not have the properties of a conventional LAM, it is easy 
to show that the results of earlier work will continue to hold.  In particular, the slope of 
the optimal indemnity schedule will be −  and such insurance will eliminate the 




  As noted earlier, a structural model with multiplicative components cannot be 
represented as a LAM.  But does that make a difference to the results of Miranda and 
Mahul?  Suppose, for a given level of aggregation, individual yields are described by  
(32)      and η   i i i y η µ = θ i i e =
where the variables continue to have the same meaning and properties as before.  Such a 
specification is natural whenever the yield impacts of one risk depend on the realization 
of the other risk as well.  For instance, even with a positive systemic shock due to say 
timely rainfall, the impact on an individual producer’s yield might be negligible because 
of a local risk such a pest or fungal infestation.  Conversely, very adverse aggregate 
shocks could nullify a good outcome in terms of local risks.  Unfortunately, in an additive 
structure, the impact of rainfall is invariant to local risks and vice-versa.
7  
To see how the multiplicative structure makes a difference, we compare it with 
the MRAC model.  The results of Miranda and Mahul apply to the MRAC model and 
  23 therefore we know that the slope of the optimal indemnity schedule is − and 
that it is invariant to the non-systemic risk and its moments.  Furthermore, with the 
optimal amount of insurance, all systemic risk is eliminated.  To see whether these results 
extend to the MRMC model, it is necessary to directly analyze the structural form (31) as 
the LAM is unavailable.   
) / ( µ µ β i i =
The area yield associated with (31) is  .  By using large sample 
approximations, we can express area yield as  
∑ =
i
i ie y µ θ
(33)        µθ = y
Substituting in (32),  
(34)      =    i i i ye y ) / ( µ µ = i iye β
where we have denoted ( by β ) /µ µi i .  Notice that, when the non-systemic risk is absent 
and is equal to its expected value 1, (34) is identical to a LAM (without non-systemic risk 
and with zero intercept).  From the results that apply to a LAM, we therefore have that 
the insurance schedule satisfies   whenever there is no non-systemic risk.  
Now suppose e
i y I β − = ) ( '
i is a random variable that takes values other than one with nonzero 
probability.  We can write producer i’s revenue with insurance as  
P y I ye P y I y i i i i − + = − + = ) ( ) ( β π  
An actuarially fair optimal insurance contract maximizes expected utility of producer i 
subject to the break-even constraint of the insurers.  Hence it solves  
(35)        subject to    Max
y I ) ( ∫∫
i ey
i i e dF y dG U ) ( ) ( ) (π ∫ =
y
y dG y I P ) ( ) (
                                                                                                                                                 
7 For an analysis of multiplicative structures arising from the interaction of price and quantity risks, see 
Mahul (2000) and Ramaswami and Roe (1992).   
  24 where U is an increasing, concave and thrice differentiable utility function, F is the 
cumulative density of the non-systemic shock, and G is the cumulative density of area 
yield derived from the probability distribution of the systemic shock θ (from (33)).  Note 
that since area yield is a function of θ  alone, it is distributed independently of the non-
systemic risk.   
Let λ be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the break-even constraint.  Then 
the optimal function I(.) satisfies for every y 
(36)     ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ' y f e dG y f U i i
ei
λ π= ∫
where  .  Clearly (36) can also be written as   dy y dF y f / ) ( ) ( =
     λ π= ] | ) ( ' [ y U E i
i.e., the optimal insurance equalizes the expected marginal utility in every state of area 
yield, y.  Differentiating the first order condition with respect to y,  
0 ))] ( ' )( ( ' [ = + y I e U E i i β π  
from which we can solve for the slope of the indemnity schedule as  
(37)   ]
) ( ' '
) ), ( ' ' (







i + − =  
0 ' ' < EU and so the sign of 
) ( ' '




e U Cov i
y U i i β π ) ( ' ' ' ) =
 is opposite to the sign of the covariance 
term.  Since  , the covariance term is positive, equal to zero 
or negative as  ' U  is positive, zero or negative.  A risk-averse agent with a positive third 
derivative of utility function has been referred to as prudent (Kimball).  It is easy to show 
that an agent with non-increasing risk-aversion must be prudent.  U  is zero for an agent 
e U i i π / ) ( ' ' ( ∂ ∂
' '
' ' '
  25 with a quadratic utility function.  Since constant or decreasing risk-aversion is a 
reasonable restriction on risk-averse behaviour, we concentrate below on the case when 
.    0 ' ' ' > U
y I − ) ( '
 
Proposition 5:  If systemic and non-systemic risks interact multiplicatively, the optimal 
insurance for a prudent producer I satisfies −   i y I β < ) ( '.
  The proof is immediate from (37).  Recall, that when non-systemic risk is absent, 
.  This can also be seen directly from (37).  Thus, we obtain the important 
result that in the presence of an uninsured non-systemic risk, it is optimal for a producer 
to choose a lower level of coverage as compared to the case where non-systemic risk is 
absent.  This is unlike the additive case where the demand for insurance against the 
systemic risk is unaffected by non-systemic risk.   
i β =
To analyse local changes in risk, consider a one-term expansion of U  as   ' '
   or   )) ( ( ' ' ' )) ( ( )) ( ( ' ' ) ( ' ' π π π π π E U E E U U − + =
)) ( ( ' ' ' ) 1 ( )) ( ( ' ' ) ( ' ' π β π π E U e y E U U i i − + =  
Substituting in (37),  
(38)   ]
)) ( ( ' '
)) ( ( ' ' '






e yVar y I i i i + − =  
Greater is the riskiness of the non-systemic risk, smaller is the optimal coverage for a 
prudent producer.  The demand for area yield insurance depends therefore on the 
uninsured non-systemic risks faced by an individual producer.   As seen earlier, the 
classification of risks as either systemic or non-systemic changes with the area size used 
for computing area yields.  In a multiplicative model, therefore, the demand for area yield 
  26 insurance will depend on the level of aggregation at which area yields are determined.  
Since higher aggregations increase non-systemic risk, they thus reduce the demand for 
area yield insurance.   
To see this, denote I1 and I2 as the optimal insurance contracts at the cluster and 
county levels of aggregation.  Suppose also that the mean yields of all producers are 
equal.  Then βi = 1, irrespective of the level of aggregation.  In an additive model, the 
optimal coverage would satisfy   where y 1 ) ( ' ) ( ' 2 1 = − = − k ck y I y I ck and yk are cluster and 
county yields.    
In a multiplicative model, individual yields, cluster yields and county yields are 
given by  ,  and  .  Hence the non-
systemic risk for cluster insurance is e but is only   for a county yield insurance.  
The variance of non-systemic risk is therefore greater with county yield insurance.  From 
Proposition 5 and (38), it follows that the optimal coverage for a prudent producer 
satisfies  1 .   
k ck ick ick ick e y 2 1 θ θ µ =
) ( ' ) ( ' 2 1 k ck y I y I > − >
k ck ck ck y 2 1 θ θ µ =
ck ick 1 θ




  The linear additive model (LAM) decomposes individual producer yield into a 
systemic component due to area yield variation and to an independent additive producer-
specific component.  While previous work has established its convenience for analyzing 
area-yield insurance, its theoretical justification has been neglected.  Inspite of its 
likeness to the CAPM model of finance, the LAM cannot be validated in a similar 
manner.    
  27   This paper has derived the LAM from aggregation of micro production functions.  
The basis for LAM rests on two conditions.  First, the aggregation must be large enough 
that all individual risk is eliminated in the area aggregate.  Second, in the individual 
production functions, the systemic and non-systemic individual risk components must be 
additive.   
Knowledge of the underlying “structural” model enables analysis of the factors 
that determine the parameters of the LAM model.  This was used in the paper to examine 
the relation between producer risk and the level of aggregation.  Other uses are possible 
such as the analysis of the relation between area-yield insurance and production 
decisions.   
  To design insurance schemes, an analysis based on the law of large numbers can 
be misleading.   We find that dropping the large numbers restriction alone does not alter 
the linear relationship between individual and area yield.  Neither does it affect the 
central results that have been obtained using the LAM.  The major outcome is that the 
decomposition now consists of two correlated risk components.  An important result is 
that it is not valid to estimate the beta parameter by ordinary least squares procedures.   
  The consequences are more serious if the assumption of additive components is 
dropped.  Then a LAM representation does not exist.  Further, previous results obtained 
in the literature are not likely to be valid.  This was shown for the important case of 
multiplicative components.  In such a set-up, area-yield insurance does not eliminate all 
systemic risk.  Moreover, the demand for insurance is not independent of the non-
systemic risk.  The greater is non-systemic risk, the lower is the demand for insurance.  
  28 As a result, the demand for area-yield insurance varies with the level of aggregation 
unlike the case in the additive components model.   
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